The only question is; which one?
A French nuclear submarine - one we won't be getting
The problem is the government won't share any of its thinking about the project.
And this is not the only area where the government's failed to explain its thinking, as this column for todays Canberra Times pointed out . . .
WE ALL WANT A NEW SUBMARINE . . .
Let’s get one thing straight – the
problem is not Senator David Johnston.
Asserting this is to in no way
excuse the Defence Minister’s hurtful hyperbole. Of course ASC can build a
canoe. He was foolish to suggest otherwise. What Johnston might have said, far
more accurately, is that when it (eventually) turned up the canoe would be
late, way over budget, and with a long list of faults requiring rectification. Or
that’s the experience with the three Air Warfare Destroyers we’ve purchased,
anyway.
Johnston’s comment reflected
quite understandable frustration with the government shipbuilder. It is,
according to the Minister, a company in need of genuine reform and expertise at
the highest level. So why, then, did it put Sophie Mirabella on the board
straight after she lost her seat at the last election? How exactly has her
appointment sliced through the dysfunction? Or did she simply add to the problem?
This is the first point: the
cabinet doesn’t understand how government businesses work. Look at the way it
sought to emasculate the ABC. Inflicting punishment without bothering to recognize
how the organisation would pass this spanking through and out the other side. Tony
Abbott seems surprised that the corporation has turned the pain around. Of
course Mark Scott was going to shut Bush Telegraph – a program speaking directly
to the National Party’s core constituency. Naturally the Corporation’s hierarchy
would use the cuts to make changes it wanted and sheet the blame home to Tony
Abbott. He treated government like a workout at the gym. He’s heavily into pain
and punishment. Well, he’s getting it.
Real change needs to be driven
from within. This government is attempting to impose it from without. Does
cabinet really wonder why all its own corporations seem to be so bad? Perhaps
the problem lies with the owner. Of course there’s no ‘buy in’ from management.
That’s because there’s been no attempt to get the organisations on board with what
the government wants. Cabinet doesn’t understand it how to ‘fix’ the government
businesses. Yet this is exactly why boards exist – to make sure the management
is doing what the owner wants. Don’t complain to the shareholders, the voters.
Fix it. Which leads to the second point: no ‘how’; no precision of objectives.
Even if cabinet itself is certain
of what it expects from its own businesses – and there’s no guarantee of this –
it’s failed to communicate these desires precisely and effectively. Even if
this small, bizarre group of repressed men (all from a similar background, all
with a similar ideological approach, all sitting around the oval cabinet table)
are able to frame their inchoate, deep private longings, they’ve failed to
communicate them. Perhaps they’ve been so busy hiding their inner desires for
so long that they can’t express them with any precision anyway. But just
insisting that things should be “better” isn’t good enough when you are
the government. Nobody would pretend everything’s going brilliantly, but this
doesn’t absolve cabinet from doing the work to articulate exactly what needs to
be better. What it expects and how this will be achieved. The seeds of failure
lie in the government’s approach. It’s outsourced all the hard work and now
seems surprised nobody wants to do it.
And this is the third, and
perhaps most crucial point: a failure of communication. This doesn’t simply
reflect the government’s incapacity to outline objectives. Communicating is a
two way street. You say something; you listen; you respond to what you’ve
heard. This dialogue ensures that everyone is part of the same process and on
the same journey. This is the most critical aspect of the current government’s
failure. This, more than anything else, explains Abbott’s abject failure. He
thinks being PM is about getting somewhere. It’s not. It’s all about the trip.
We know, despite all the promises
and plans, we’re setting sail into uncharted waters each time we install a new
government. We hope they’ll keep their promises, but we know things crop up
unexpectedly. We know some promises are more important than others. What we
expect – and need – is to be kept happy as passengers in the boat. The way this
is done is through communication.
Bob Hawke was a master at this.
He listened and reacted, which is why Paul Keating called him “jellyback”.
Keating thought he knew better, won an election, stopped listening, and was
booted out as far and fast as possible. While wearing a hearing-aid, John
Howard became our second-longest Prime Minster. Kevin Rudd failed to listen to
his own party and was dispatched with extreme prejudice. Julia Gillard failed
to communicate with the electorate to become yet another failed leader.
What’s the common trait of our recent
rush of one-term leaders? What explains why they haven’t measured-up? They knew
where they wanted to go: they just couldn’t be bothered bringing us along with
them.
That’s Abbott’s problem. And the
submarine’s a classic example. I’m really very interested in this project –
from a military, industrial, technological and political point of view. A
number of sailors (thank you Commodore), companies (thank you SAAB), scientists
(thank you DSTO) and politicians have kept feeding me with information on the
submarine project – they must be wondering when I’m going to do an article on
it.
Why haven’t I? This government’s been
too busy making problems for itself. It won’t let us in on any of the complex
decision trade-offs that come along with this huge decision. It thinks that all
its work is focussed on what happens around the cabinet table. It’s not. This
is our submarine. We want a part of it. Why is ASC supposedly so “hopeless”?
Why should we buy Japanese?
A government that won’t explain
can’t be trusted.
We have 4 requirements.
ReplyDelete1) It has to be a decent sub when it gets to where it's needed.
2) It has to have a small crew.
3) It has to have a very long range.
4) It cannot be nuclear -we don't have the infrastructure for that.
None of the "off the shelf" designs meet all four criteria, and all four are essential, not "nice to have".
Regarding Soryu boats - we have enough personnel for 2 crew complements, one ashore training, one at sea. We'd need 3 hulls, one in short-term refit, one in long-term refit to have one on ops. Talk of buying 12 is bizarre. We need 2 at sea, but the crew requirements make that impossible.
They also only have half the range needed. As do all other non-nuke boats in service - other than the Collins. What we really need is a newer, slightly uprated Collins with far more reliable equipment. One that doesn't cost an arm and a leg.
It's a problem as ASC doesn't appear to do "reliability". Nor "not insanely expensive".
Lol Nicholas, the history and process of defence procurement is a very complicated and much vexed subject and the submarine element of the RAN is one part of the problem as much as an ideological one (buy global or buy local). You could write another book on the situation and be able to fully fill the pages....and that's before going anywhere near the whole issue of RAN capacity to crew the boats (as the submarine crew complements are a hard niche to fill)
ReplyDeleteNic Stuart AM
ReplyDelete